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This paper investigates the in￿ uence of women in politics on decision-making using public educa-
tional expenditures as the outcome of interest. The results suggest that an increase in the share of
female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of educational expenditures to GDP by
0.028 percentage points. I then consider some contexts, on which the in￿ uence of female legislators may
depend. The e⁄ect of female legislators on educational policies is strengthened accounting for forms
of government, but not in￿ uenced by left-wing government, electoral rules, parliamentary system and
non-marriage. Moreover, this study supports the hypothesis that the identity of the legislator matters
for policy.
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1 Introduction
Given that political institutions play an important role in policy-making and are led by politicians of
di⁄erent political persuasions, it is of interest to investigate whether characteristics of these policymakers
determine the type of policies. The motivation behind this study is therefore to understand whether the
increasing fraction of female legislators in the OECD countries raises public educational expenditures,
which the literature suggests is one of women￿ s primary concerns. 1
The in￿ uence of female legislators on educational expenditures may depend on some external contexts,
such as the presence of a left-wing government, the parliamentary system, the electoral system, the form
of government, the political cycle and the marriage status of women in general . An important task of this
study is to control for these contexts in order to clarify the e⁄ect of women. For example, it is argued that
left-wing governments expand total educational investment more than right-wing governments. The rise
in the female labor force participation, which may parallel the rise in women￿ s participation in politics,
makes women more likely to favor the left. Unicameralism may enhance the in￿ uence of urban areas,
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1Data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1992 highlight the fact that the parliamentary
committee on education is one of the areas in which women legislators are most numerous among countries in
Western Europe.
1where voters demand more educational expenditures than in rural ones. While there are more policies
regarding women￿ s traditional role in the family, more women are able to enter labor market and may be
encouraged to participate in politics. Electoral systems probably a⁄ect women￿ s representation, which, in
turn, a⁄ects educational expenditures. In addition, a country with a parliamentary regime may prefer a
large government and support policies that bene￿t the majority. Investments in education may be one of
the targets. The more often elections are held, the more representatives are accountable to their mandate,
which may lead to less in￿ uence of females on educational expenditures. It has also been suggested that
women￿ s political preferences follow marriage status.
I ￿nd that the greater the representation of women in parliament, the higher the public educational
expenditures. Speci￿cally, my results suggest that increasing the number of female legislators by one per-
centage point increases the ratio of educational expenditures to GDP by 0.028 percentage points. The
contextual e⁄ect of female legislators on educational policies is strengthened accounting for forms of gov-
ernment, but it is not in￿ uenced by the presence of a left-wing government, electoral rules, a parliamentary
system, political cycle or non-marriage.
A possible explanation for these results is based on the fact that female politicians may care about
women￿ s issues more than their male colleagues. Edlund and Pande (2002) suggest that the reason women
have di⁄erent preferences from men is that women have default rights to children and men only get part
of the right if they sign a contract for marriage where they promise to provide for their wife and children.
In addition to this explanation, since the 1970s, wives are no longer legally subordinate to their husbands,
and the obligation to provide for the family no longer rests solely on the husband (Edlund, Haider, and
Pande (2005)).
Since women and men play di⁄erent roles in society and therefore have di⁄erent interests and priorities,
it follows that women￿ s interests cannot be adequately represented in decision-making by men. Ideally,
representatives of groups with speci￿c interests and perspectives should participate directly in decision-
making processes and hold leadership roles to ensure that both the agenda of issues to be considered and
the decisions subsequently made incorporate their views. This is supported by a theory that the identity
of the legislator matters for policy determination if the candidates have a commitment problem (Besley
and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)).
Nevertheless, even if male politicians are aware of gender di⁄erences and seek to represent women, they
lack information in the same way that mainstream decision makers are unable to capture the perspectives
and needs of minorities in the society. W￿ngnerud (2005), using parliamentary survey studies conducted
in the Swedish Parliament, ￿nds that female parliamentarians consider the duty of promoting the inter-
ests/views of women much more important than their male colleagues. Moreover, female members in the
parliament have more contacts with women￿ s organizations than male members. Since female politicians
understand women as a group, they, to a greater extent than male politicians, represent the interests of
women.
2The above political phenomenon has been investigated in several empirical studies. For example,
Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o (2004) study the e⁄ect of women as policy makers through a randomized policy
experiment in India. They ￿nd that the reservation of one-third of the seats for women in Panchayats
(local rural self-government) in the states of West Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive e⁄ect on investment
in infrastructure related to women￿ s needs, such as drinking water and roads. Speci￿cally, in India, gender
is a relevant factor when making decisions about di⁄erent kinds of investments.
Many recent studies discuss the e⁄ect of female legislators on policies, such as Besley and Case (2000)
and Clots-Figureas (2007). Besley and Case (2000) assume there is an e⁄ect of female legislators on worker￿ s
compensation bene￿ts and use female legislators as an instrument to understand the e⁄ect of these bene￿ts
on employment. Clots-Figureas (2007) uses quasi-experimental election outcomes to estimate the causal
e⁄ect of politician gender. She ￿nds that primary educational attainment is higher in urban areas of India
when female political representation is higher.
Most studies of this issue, however, focus on within-country data. The contribution of my paper is
therefore to analyze the e⁄ect of women￿ s representation on educational expenditures using cross-country
data and to introduce contextual e⁄ects. Some political factors, such as electoral rule and form of govern-
ment, are mostly constant during the sample period and are therefore less likely to be reported in studies
with individual country data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background and
describes the history of female participation in politics and their policy preferences. Section 3 discusses
the empirical speci￿cation and gives a description of the data. Section 4 presents the results of the paper,
and discusses whether the e⁄ect of female legislators on education depends on other contexts. Section 5
concludes.
2 Background
The theoretical background for this study is based on models supporting the fact that the identity of a
legislator matters for policy. According to the median voter model, if the candidates only care about
winning the elections and commit to implementing speci￿c policies once elected, political decisions should
only re￿ ect the preferences of the median voters (Downs (1957)), and the gender of legislators would not
matter for policy outcomes. However, if the candidates could not commit to speci￿c policies, the identity
of the legislator matters for policy determination (Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski
(1996)). This in￿ uence on policy will be enhanced when there is increasing political representation of a
certain group. According to this set of models, if politicians do not commit to implement a given set of
policies once in power, a candidate￿ s personal ideology will determine policy outcomes.
In this paper, it is assumed the representation of female politicians will support issues re￿ ecting women￿ s
preference as long as women can vote in the elections. This line of models has been applied by Pande
3(2003), Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o (2004), and Svaleryd (2007). 2
Turning to a description of women in politics, during 1960s-1980s, the second wave of the feminist
movement, political parties across Western Europe came under pressure to adopt policies attractive to
female voters and to provide greater opportunities for women￿ s participation in the formal political arena.
This was the case even in those countries where a well-organized women￿ s movement was not developed.
However, there were di⁄erences in family background among male and female legislators. According to
Davis (1997), female legislators were less likely than male legislators to be married, or to have children,
and were less likely to enter politics without spousal support. Even in the cases where female legislators
did have children, the children tended to be older than the o⁄spring of their male counterparts. Political
careers for women, much like careers in other professions, often entailed an ￿either/or￿choice. For this
reason, female legislators tended to enter politics later in life than their male counterparts, at least in the
early period of that study.
Furthermore, the role perceptions of female representatives seem to di⁄er from their male counterparts
in some ways. Thomas (1994) notes that in the United States, female delegates have been found to value
aspects of their jobs related to civic duty, while men have been more inclined to highlight legislative
e⁄ectiveness or status within the legislative chamber. Although women are just as likely as men to
see themselves as delegates or trustees, women are more likely to see themselves as representatives of
other women. Therefore, women give priority to legislation about women, and take pride in legislative
accomplishments in areas of traditional concern to women. 3
One possible reason why women have di⁄erent preferences from men rests on the assumption that
women have default rights to children and men get part of the right only if they sign a contract for
marriage where they promise to provide for their wife and children (Edlund and Pande (2002)). This
gives rise to the traditional division of labor between men and women, where women are more involved
in functions close to the home and household. Hence, women tend to purchase goods for children and for
general household consumption. As a result, they would like to choose a higher rate of saving than men,
in the form of institutions such as ROSCAS (Anderson and Baland (2002)). 4 The rise in the divorce
rate in recent decades in Western society is suggested to lead women to prefer redistribution policies if
men transfer resources to women in marriage. However, there is nothing normative about this kind of
model. Increasingly, marriage is delayed or skirted entirely as witnessed by rising levels of non-marital
fertility and cohabitation in the Western world. The mother is the default custodian of her children unless
married, in which case, she and her husband share custody. 5 Since the 1970s, wives are no longer
2Pande (2003) ￿nds that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which bene￿t from the man-
date. In addition, the ￿nding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies.
Svaleryd (2007) studies whether the degree of women￿ s representation in Swedish local councils a⁄ects local public
expenditure patterns.
3In the book ￿How Women Legislate￿ , Thomas states that ￿... For most women, their public sphere role was
only half of their job; they continued to bear the major responsibility for home and health. Given this dual role, it
is not surprising that women have used their latitude to participate in the legislative arena to make private sphere
issues legitimate governmental concerns.￿
4According to Anderson and Baland (2002), ROSCAS refers to rotating savings and credit associations.
5\Unmarried mothers and fathers can, if mutually agreed upon, reallocate custodial rights so as to mimic the
4legally subordinated to their husbands, and the obligation to provide for the family no longer rests solely
on the husband (Edlund, Haider, and Pande (2005)). Women may therefore favor those policies related
to children and family, such as education and welfare issues, more than men when they participate in the
decision-making process.
Even though party discipline may restrict female legislators￿work on women￿ s issues, it appears that
they often work across party lines to the extent permissible by party leaders. As women have a sizeable
presence, their policy impact is even greater because male legislators are also more likely to sponsor
legislation considering the social, legal, and economic position of women than are male legislators in arenas
in which women do not have a signi￿cant numeric presence. 6 The dynamics of electoral competition may
play a role here. If male politicians do not sponsor more legislation concerning women, female politicians
might take over their vote shares from voters who pay attention to women￿ s concerns.
Davis (1997) points out that most of the women in government leadership of countries in Western
Europe are in such ministries as cultural, social welfare, women￿ s a⁄airs, and education once they are
elected in parliament and appointed to government. 7 Moreover, there is evidence from empirical
studies showing that women support educational spending once they are able to participate in politics.
8 From this point of view, I therefore take educational policy as the outcome of interest and study the
in￿ uence of female politicians on decisions regarding educational expenditures. In the ￿eld of education, it
seems reasonable to expect that women care about both the quantity and quality of children￿ s education.
At earlier stages of economic development, women support educational policies related to people￿ s basic
needs, such as increasing schooling accessibility and literacy rate. 9 On the other hand, it is more likely
that women support policies about improving quality of education after the infrastructure of compulsory
education is well-established. High quality education is not only important for knowledge development,
but also for overcoming long-standing inequalities. 10 I therefore expect to observe a positive e⁄ect of
female parliamentarians on educational expenditures.
marital situation.￿See Edlund, Haider, and Pande (2005).
6See Thomas (1994).
7￿... If women are to be appointed to government, then they must ￿rst be elected to parliament.￿See Davis
(1997).
8Svaleryd (2007) shows that female legislators, relative to their male colleagues, regard education as a more
important sector than elderly care in Sweden. Lott and Kenny (1999) state that the in￿ uence of women￿ s su⁄rage
in US may have been re￿ ected in the large increase in educational spending, and large increases in state transfers
to local governments, which spend over a quarter of their budgets on education.
9For example, Clots-Figueras (2007).
10Schwindt-Bayer (2007) points out that countries need to ensure that women are in the candidate pool by
encouraging women to continue their education beyond secondary school and get degrees in professional ￿elds that
can be springboards to a political career such as a law degree, or by getting more women into the paid labor force
and providing leadership training such that they can hold managerial positions.
53 Empirical speci￿cation and data
3.1 Empirical speci￿cation
First, I consider the following empirical speci￿cation:
EDUi;t = ￿ + ￿FEMi;t + "i;t
where i denotes country indices, EDU denotes public educational expenditures and FEM denotes the
fraction of female legislators. Representation in the lower house rather than the upper house is used
in cross-country studies of this type because in bicameral legislatures lower houses generally have more
legislative power than upper houses. 11 Here I expect ￿ to be positive if a larger proportion of women
in parliament leads to higher spending on education. There are likely to be di⁄erences across countries.
Fixed country e⁄ect estimates may therefore be needed to capture the causal impact of female legislators
on educational expenditures. Nevertheless, the in￿ uence of female legislators may depend on some political
factors, such as electoral rule. For example, the Nordic countries continued to elect the highest number of
women to their parliaments, and the electoral system for all of these countries is proportional. Since many
political factors do not vary a lot within countries, I consider group ￿xed e⁄ects rather than country ￿xed
e⁄ects in order to retain su¢ cient information. The empirical speci￿cation thus becomes
EDUi;t = ￿g + ￿1FEMi;t + ￿2Ci;t + ￿3FEMi;t ￿ Ci;t + "i;t (1)
where i denotes country indices, ￿g denotes group ￿xed e⁄ect and C denotes contexts. Countries are
grouped according to factors, such as geographical proximity and/or institutional proximity. Vandenbuss-
che, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) use the same criteria to group countries. 12 I also control group-speci￿c
time trends in the regression, which may exist in both the proportion of female legislators and educational
expenditures. In the estimation of equation (1), I subtract the means of FEM and contexts, if it is not a
binary variable, for the interaction term. This provides a useful and interesting interpretation.
The contexts discussed here are: the presence of a left-wing government, electoral rule, the parliamen-
tary system, the form of government, the political cycle length and the marriage pattern in the society.
Left-wing governments are believed to favor policies considering child-related issues and social welfare
more than right-wing governments. Speci￿cally, it has been suggested that left-wing governments, in
contrast to right-wing governments, are more likely to prefer public education. In addition, the rise in
female labor force participation, which may mirror the rise in women￿ s participation in politics, makes
women more likely to favor the left due to their likelihood to demand welfare policies concerning women￿ s
traditional role in the family. I therefore take left-wing government as one of the contexts that need to be
controlled.
11The results using the average fraction of female parliamentarians in both the upper and lower houses are similar
to the results using only the fraction of female parliamentarians in the lower house.
12Their results become statistically signi￿cant after substituting group dummies for country dummies. Statistical
e¢ ciency may provide a good reason for this.
6Electoral rules indicate whether one country adopts a majoritarian or other type of electoral system. In
the literature, the use of proportional representation￿ the current system in all of the Nordic countries￿
is singled out as one of the most important factors that in￿ uence a high representation of women. For
example, in the Netherlands and Spain, where the electoral system is proportional, the share of female
parliamentarians is large: 36% in the Netherlands and 30.5% in Spain in the end of 2007. In France, in
contrast, where a majoritarian electoral system is in use, only 18% of parliamentarians are women.
According to the political science literature, one feature of unicameralism is that urban areas with
large populations have more in￿ uence than sparsely populated rural areas. Since the participation rate of
female labor force is higher in urban areas than that in rural areas, women in urban areas may demand
more policies pertaining to children and the family once they choose to go to the labor market. Increasing
numbers of policies that take care of women￿ s traditional role in the family lead to more women being able
to enter labor market. At the same time, more women may be encouraged to participate in politics. Hence,
a unicameral system, which re￿ ects more urban demands should have a positive impact on educational
expenditures and may matter for the level of female legislators.
Several predictions are generated from the theoretical research on how policy outcomes are in￿ uenced
by di⁄erent forms of government. It has been suggested that parliamentary regimes are generally associ-
ated with larger governments, i.e. higher taxes and overall spending, than presidential regimes. Persson
and Tabellini (2003) provide two possible explanations. First, in parliamentary regimes, it is easier for
politicians to collude with each other at the voters￿expense because of the greater concentration of powers,
which results in higher rents and higher taxes. Second, parliamentary regimes need continuous con￿dence
of the majority in the legislature to maintain their powers throughout an entire election period. Spending
thus optimally becomes directed towards broad programs bene￿ting a majority of voters. Educational
policy may be one of the targets.
Political cycle refers to the length of terms in o¢ ce. It has been suggested that accountability of politi-
cians is stronger if their term in power is shorter. In other words, policy decision may re￿ ect the preferences
of median voters rather than the preferences of politicians when elections are held more frequently. With
respect to this point of view, I check whether the assumption behind this study, i.e. the identity of the
legislator matters for policy, is reasonable or not.
Edlund and Pande (2002) suggest that women are more likely to support the Democratic Party in
the United States following divorce based on the assumption that marriage transfers resources from men
to women. Edlund, Haider, and Pande (2005) extend the analysis of Edlund and Pande (2002) by using
data from a number of West European countries and other measures of non-marriage, including divorce
incidence, out-of wedlock fertility, and female age at ￿rst marriage. Their ￿ndings also suggest that the
rise in non-marriage causes men and women to diverge in their preferences for redistribution to children.
From this point of view, an increase in non-marriage may encourage women not only to enter labor market
and be self-supporting, but also to participate in the formal political arena and seek policies that deal with
7women￿ s traditional role in family, such as investment in human capital of children.
For the purpose of clarifying contextual e⁄ect of female politicians on educational expenditure, I esti-
mate the model by addressing only one context at a time.
3.2 Data description
The dataset used here covers 19 OECD countries between 1960 and 2005, and includes Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The measure of female involvement in politics mainly comes from the IPU￿ s survey, Women in Par-
liaments: 1945-1995. 13 This publication lists the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women in
upper and lower houses in each country. The variable FEM is set equal to the proportion of women in the
lower chamber. Figure 1 presents the fraction of female legislators in each country from 1960 to 2005 at
5-year intervals. Nordic countries have a marked increase in the number of women serving in parliament
over this period, while most of the Southern European countries have a relatively ￿ at pattern.
Furthermore, data on public educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP, which is named EDU
here, between 1950 and 1995 at 5-year intervals is obtained directly from VAM (2006). They rely on
Unesco￿ s Statistical Yearbook (1999), which provides data on public expenditures between 1970 and 1995,
and construct the early part of the series by working backward through previous Yearbooks. The series
after 1995 is collected from Education at a Glance 2006 published by OECD, which is also based on the
survey by Unesco. 14 Figure 2 presents the ratio of total public educational expenditures to GDP in each
country. In Belgium and France, there is a relatively stable ratio of educational spending to GDP, while in
Portugal and Greece there is a continuous increase in this ratio over time. In general, all countries invest
less than 10% of their GDP in education.
Though not always true for every country, there are some interesting common patterns comparing Fig-
ure 1 with Figure 2. Greece, Portugal, and Switzerland experienced an increase in both the representation
of women in politics and in educational investments over the sample period. Furthermore, as the fraction
of female legislators in Ireland, Italy, and Norway decreased in late 1990s, there is a comparable drop in
educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP in these three countries. These trends suggest a positive
correlation between female legislators and educational investment.
In addition to using educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable,
which captures the relative extent of country￿ s investments in education, this study also uses total public
educational expenditures per capita as another dependent variable, which helps understand the quantitative
e⁄ect of female legislators on educational spending. Figure 3 presents total public educational expenditures
per capita at constant prices in 2000 USD, obtained by multiplying the ratio of total public educational
13The series after 1995 is collected from the website of IPU.
14Data provided in this edition is only through 2003. I obtain the data for 2005 by assuming the growth rate of
educational expenditures from 2003 to 2005 is the same as that from 2000 to 2003 in each country.
8expenditures to GDP by real GDP per capita. 15 The ￿gure shows a long-run linear growth pattern of
expenditures in most countries, except the Netherlands.
Data on the presence of a left-wing government are obtained from Mapping Policy Preferences: Esti-
mates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998 and Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates
for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003. Edu-
cation expansion is one of the criteria deciding the right-left position of each party in both datasets. 16 I
calculate the percentage of seats occupied by left-wing parties in each election to represent the intensity
of left-wing government.
I collected data on electoral rules and forms of government from Persson and Tabellini (2003). Majori-
tarian is an indicator for electoral rules, which equals 1 if all the lower house is elected under plurality rule
and 0 otherwise. 17 Presidential is a binary variable to denote forms of government, with the value 1 in
presidential regimes and 0 otherwise. 18 There are only two countries belonging to presidential regime in
this study, Switzerland and the United States. Unicameral is a binary variable referring to parliamentary
system. 19
Term represents the time interval between elections, which is used to represent the political cycle and
is obtained from the IPU survey data. It varies across the sample period among countries, except for New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the US. 20 In countries where there are frequent elections, the value of
Term is smaller. Non-marriage is represented by Divorce, which refers to the crude divorce rate reported
in the Demographic Yearbook issued by United Nations.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
Estimation of equation (1) without the controls for political factors is reported in Table 1. When country
dummies are included, increasing female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of educa-
tional expenditures to GDP by 0.029 percentage points. 21 This e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant. In
consideration of results driven by systematic di⁄erences, I include group dummies instead and present the
15The data on real GDP per capita at constant prices in 2000 USD are collected from Penn World Table 6.2.
16Education expansion in these dataset considers the need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all
levels, and excludes technical training.
17Persson and Tabellini (2003) only consider legislative elections in lower house. The value of Majoritarian equals
0 if the system is either strict proportionality or mixed.
18According to Persson and Tabellini (2003), most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classi￿ed
as parliamentary. Countries are categorized as having a presidential regime if the existence of a government is
without a con￿dence requirement. For example, France is a parliamentary regime since the legislature has an
exclusive and unrestricted right of censure, even though the president is elected directly.
19Most of the countries examined had a stable parliamentary system during the sample period except for Spain
and Sweden. Spain switched from a unicameral system to a bicameral system in 1977, and Sweden switched from
a bicameral system to a unicameral system in 1970.
20Term is ￿xed at 3 years in New Zealand, 4 years in Norway, 4 years in Switzerland, and 2 years in the US.
21Since there are 19 countries in the sample and only 10 observations in each country, it has been suggested to
ignore country trends when country dummies are included.
9results in column (2). The standard errors are smaller in the case that includes group dummies. In other
words, group dummies keep more information and therefore provide better estimation.
As shown in column (2), female legislators have a positive impact on educational expenditures. However,
group-speci￿c time trends should be included because of an increasing pattern in the proportion of female
legislators across countries. Column (3) provides the results including group-speci￿c trends, and the results
are closer to the results with country dummies in column (1). Nonetheless, those factors which in￿ uence
the decision of educational expenditures in individual countries should also be at work once group dummies
are included. I expect both the educational expenditures and political opportunities available to women
to be a⁄ected by the overall level of social and economic development. Demographic factors, such as the
proportion of the population under age 25 or above age 65, in￿ uence the allocation of government budget
to education. More women in politics may re￿ ect higher female participation rate in labor market and
increasing attainment rate of women in higher education as well. In consideration of the above, I add real
GDP per capita, fraction of population under age 25, fraction of population above age 65, female labor
participation rate and lagged female attainment rate in higher education as controls when including group
dummies. The results are presented in column (4). The group dummies are jointly signi￿cant with a
p-value of 0. The result is very encouraging in this respect because the coe¢ cient is consistent with the
expectation. Increasing the fraction of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of
educational expenditures to GDP by 0.028 percentage points. In other words, the demand for education
by legislators increases as the proportion of female legislators increases.
Model results with total public educational expenditures per capita as the dependent variable are
presented in columns (5)-(8). In column (8), a 1% increase in GDP per capita raises total public educational
expenditures per capita by 1%, which implies that education is a normal good in developed countries.
The e⁄ect of female legislators on educational expenditures is positive and statistically signi￿cant when
controlling for this overall income e⁄ect. Total public educational expenditures per capita increases by
0.43% when the fraction of female legislators increases by one percentage point. 22
4.2 Contextual e⁄ects of female legislators on educational expenditures
Though there is evidence of a positive e⁄ect of female legislators on educational expenditures, does such
an e⁄ect depend on other contexts? This section discusses the e⁄ect of di⁄erent contexts on educational
expenditures in order to clarify the e⁄ect of female legislators. Table 2 presents the summary of these
contexts across countries.
22I have also examined the e⁄ect of female legislators on di⁄erent levels of education using the same empirical
speci￿cation. The results show that increases in female legislators are more likely to raise investments in primary
and secondary education, while they also yield relevant positive in￿ uence on the investment in tertiary education.
104.2.1 Does a left-wing government prefer more education?
Estimation of equation (1) with the control for left-wing government is reported in Table 3. Columns (1)
and (4) replicate the results from columns (4) and (8) in Table 1. I take these as the baseline results. In
all the regressions, I control for group dummies and group speci￿c trends. 23 The results reveal that a
left-wing government per se does not impact the decisions on educational expenditures. In columns (2) and
(5) female legislators maintain a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on educational spending, where the extent
is closer to the baseline result. I add the interaction term of left-wing government and female legislators in
columns (3) and (6). Given that the mean value of left-wing government in the sample is 0.62, an increase
in the fraction of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of educational expenditures
on GDP by 0.05 standard deviations from the mean level of left-wing intensity. This e⁄ect is signi￿cant
based on the joint test. Left-wing governments distribute more net money to education given the mean
level of female legislators, even though this e⁄ect is not signi￿cant.
4.2.2 Does electoral rule matter?
Estimation of equation (1) with a control for electoral rule is reported in Table 4. In general, results
in columns (2) and (5) show that e⁄ect of female legislators on educational expenditures is irrelevant,
while electoral rule does play a role in educational investments. The negative e⁄ect of plurality rule may
re￿ ect less impact on women￿ s representation in politics rather than proportionality rule, which is likely to
lead to lower spending on education. To investigate whether the e⁄ect of female legislators on education
is strengthened by proportional representation, I include the interaction between female legislators and
electoral rule. The interaction e⁄ect of female legislators and electoral rule is not signi￿cant, which indicates
that electoral arrangements do not strengthen women￿ s in￿ uence on educational policies. It may also imply
that the fraction of female legislators share the same information as electoral rules since the partial e⁄ect
of female legislators is insigni￿cant. Nevertheless, electoral rules per se have no e⁄ect on educational
expenditures.
4.2.3 Does the parliamentary system matter?
Estimation of equation (1) with the controls for having a parliamentary system is reported in Table 5. In
general, the joint tests point out that a parliamentary system has no in￿ uence on educational expenditures
as percentage of GDP, but is relevant to total educational spending. On the other hand, the representation
of female legislators has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on educational expenditures. Moreover, this
positive e⁄ect of female legislators does not depend on which parliamentary system is adopted within a
country.
23The same structure applies to all of the following tables.
114.2.4 Does government form matter?
The estimation of Equation (1) with the control for government form is reported in Table 6. The in￿ uence of
presidential regime on educational expenditures is signi￿cant and negative, which supports the view in the
literature that parliamentary regimes usually raise spending directed towards broad programs. Including
the interaction of female politicians and presidential regime gives a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of female
legislators on educational expenditures. One country is more likely to have an honest government when its
government is a presidential regime rather than a parliamentary regime. The allocation of the government
budget may therefore be more e⁄ective, and ￿ ow into the chapters that concern women more. Hence,
having more women in politics increases the weight of educational investments and gives a larger net
e⁄ect of female legislators if the government is a presidential regime. Moreover, even though a presidential
regime has a negative e⁄ect on educational expenditures, the e⁄ect becomes positive when the parliament
introduces more female legislators than average.
4.2.5 Does the length of the political cycle matter?
Estimation of equation (1) with the control for the length of the political cycle is reported in Table 7.
In columns (2) and (5), the length of the political cycle has no e⁄ect on educational policy, while female
parliamentarians have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on educational investments. The same conclusion is
obtained from the joint tests in columns (3) and (6), where the interaction term is included. This implies
that the policy decision is determined by the preferences of women in politics rather than the preferences of
median voters, which supports the assumption behind this study, i.e., the identity of the legislator matters
for policy.
4.2.6 Does non-marriage matter?
The estimation of Equation (1) with the control for non-marriage is reported in Table 8. In general, results
in columns (2) and (5) show that e⁄ect of female legislators on educational expenditures is relevant after
controlling for the divorce rate. Moreover, the divorce rate is also positively correlated with government
expenditures on education, which is likely to re￿ ect female voters￿preferences. Since the divorce rate and
women￿ s political preferences are thought to be linked, I include the interaction of female legislators and
divorce rate. The joint tests in columns (3) and (6) show that female legislators have a relevant impact on
spending in education. Although the interaction term is not signi￿cant, the positive e⁄ect indicates that
the gender di⁄erential implications of non-marriage may turn into the provision of education to children.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the in￿ uence of women￿ s participation in politics on decision-
making. I take educational expenditures as the outcome of interest. The contribution of this study is to
12investigate the e⁄ect of female legislators on educational expenditures by cross-country data, while most
of the previous literature studying e⁄ect of female legislators on policies is based on within-country data.
Moreover, I consider the political contextual e⁄ect on female legislators, which is less likely to be contained
in studies with individual country data.
The baseline results suggest that the greater the representation of women in parliament, the higher the
educational expenditures as percentage of GDP and the higher the educational expenditures per capita.
In addition, the e⁄ect of female legislators on educational policies may depend on some contexts, such as
the presence of a left-wing government, electoral rules, parliamentary system, government form, the length
of the political cycle, and rates of non-marriage. Although electoral rules have been believed to be the
force behind the increasing representation of women, this factor does not strengthen or weaken the e⁄ect
of female legislators on educational expenditures. Including the variable ￿left-wing government￿in the
regression does not in￿ uence the e⁄ect of female legislators. Actually, more female legislators results in
higher educational expenditures given the government is at the mean level of left-wing intensity. Left-wing
governments allocate more money to education in net given the mean level of female legislators, although
the e⁄ect is not signi￿cant. Controlling for a parliamentary system gives a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
of female legislators. For government forms, the results show that the proportion of female legislators
is again relevant to educational expenditures. Even though a presidential regime has a negative e⁄ect
on educational expenditures, the e⁄ect becomes positive when the parliament introduces more female
legislators than average. I further check whether the assumption behind this study is reasonable or not.
The results demonstrate that accountability of politicians does not in￿ uence educational policy decisions,
which supports the assumption that the identity of the legislator matters for policy. Since it has been
suggested that women￿ s political preferences follow marriage status, I check whether an increase in the
divorce rate strengthens women￿ s in￿ uence on educational policies. The e⁄ect of female legislators is
robust.
This study emphasizes the e⁄ect of female legislators on educational policies on a cross-country basis.
It would be interesting, however, to look also at the e⁄ect of female legislators on other type of policies,
such as social welfare and health. Consequently, this may constitute an area for future research of women￿ s
impact on the economy through politics.
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15Figure 1: The fraction of female legislators
Note: 1. x-axis is year, and y-axis is percentage. 2. Country isocodes are ￿AUS￿for Australia, ￿AUT￿for Austria,
￿BEL￿for Belgium, ￿CAN￿for Canada, ￿DNK￿for Denmark, ￿FIN￿for Finland, ￿FRA￿for France, ￿GRC￿for
Greece, ￿IRL￿for Ireland, ￿ITA￿for Italy, ￿NLD￿for Netherlands, ￿NZL￿for New Zealand, ￿NOR￿for Norway,
￿PRT￿for Portugal, ￿ESP￿for Spain, ￿SWE￿for Sweden, ￿CHE￿for Switzerland, ￿GBR￿for United Kingdom,
and ￿USA￿for United States.
16Figure 2: The ratio of total public educational expenditures to GDP
Note: x-axis is year, and y-axis is percentage.
17Figure 3: Total public educational expenditures per capita, 2000 prices, USD
Note: x-axis is year, and y-axis is total public educational expenditures in 2000 constant prices of USD.
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